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What Are Jobs Worth?
How much are jobs subsidized by 
state and local governments really worth? 
Policymakers have achieved surprisingly 
little consensus on the character and size 
of gains from economic development 
projects. Measurement of such gains must 
inevitably derive from a vision of the 
labor market. For subsidies to generate 
real gains for local workers, those workers 
must be unemployed or underemployed. 
Recent research on job chains provides 
a natural approach to such measurement 
issues. It addresses not only the number 
of job vacancies created as a result of 
a subsidized business investment or 
expansion, but also the extent to which 
gains are achieved by the unemployed and 
the underemployed, whether skilled or 
unskilled. 
The tide of strong economic growth 
at the state and local level lifts all boats. 
Workers in regions experiencing such 
growth are more likely to be employed, 
more likely to work full time, and more 
likely to take home a thicker paycheck 
than workers in sluggish regions.  Studies 
by Bartik (1991, 1996) and others have 
forcefully made such points.  But state 
and local governments seldom undertake 
economic development projects on a 
scale likely to affect the overall growth 
rate of the state or local economy. Most 
state and local efforts billed as economic 
development projects take the form of 
subsidies to a relatively small number of 
private fi rms. Project analysts are left in 
a quandary as to how to evaluate project 
benefi ts.  
Any development project, whether 
a new auto fi rm or an airline terminal, 
announces new jobs, but the important 
question is, “How much are these new 
jobs really worth?” Wages generated by 
the project often are touted by sponsors 
as a dollar measure of benefi ts, but many, 
indeed most, of the workers hired into 
new jobs are already employed. Hence, 
the wage increases achieved by such 
job changers are likely to be relatively 
modest. Is this all a new job is worth? 
Common sense suggests there must be 
more. The natural question under the 
circumstances is to ask what happened to 
the jobs left vacant by the job changers. 
Of course, then we want to know what 
happened to any other vacancies left open 
further down the chain. 
To value a new job, we need to value 
the gains made all along the job chain 
set in motion by the appearance of that 
job. For those eager to get to the bottom 
line, our estimate is that for every dollar 
of wages in a newly created job, the 
economic benefi t is about 50 cents. That 
is a big discount on new payroll, but it 
still leaves a lot more than just the wage 
increases to new hires in the project itself.
Below, we describe our logic for reaching 
this estimate using job chains. 
Simulating Job Chains
The chain metaphor has been used 
to analyze a wide variety of markets 
involving durable goods, such as housing. 
Since every house has an address, 
housing chain research proceeds in a 
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straightforward fashion. Just ask the 
incoming household of a new dwelling 
where he/she/they moved from and then 
go back to that unit and ask the new 
household moving in there the same 
question. Continue in this fashion through 
successive vacancies until the chain ends 
with an in-mover to the region, a newly 
formed household, or a demolition. 
Unfortunately, most jobs in the United 
States lack an identifying “address” or 
any other clear record independent of the 
workers holding those jobs. In general, job 
data are not collected as if jobs  
are entities in themselves, to be filled, 
vacated, or destroyed. Rather, job data 
are gathered essentially as by-products of 
collecting information on the individuals 
who occupy them. While a number of 
data sources allow researchers to track job 
histories of sample individuals, virtually 
none allow tracking of the successive 
individuals employed in a given position. 
Under the circumstances, the 
possibilities for collecting data on actual 
job chains are slight.1  The empirical 
problem is very similar to that facing an 
input–output (IO) researcher.  After all, 
an IO multiplier for an apparel firm is not 
estimated by actually logging the sale of 
cloth to that firm, then the sale of cotton 
to the particular textile firm supplying the 
cloth, then the sale of petroleum to those 
specific farmers selling the cotton and so 
on. Instead, IO researchers estimate an 
average “input vector” for each industry, 
assume those vectors to remain constant 
whatever the use of the industry’s product, 
and then “simulate” the necessary 
character of production chains. 
To use such a synthetic approach for 
job chains, we need to define and measure 
the equivalent of the IO input vector 
for each type of new job. If we break 
jobs down into discrete groups based on 
wages or some other general measure of 
quality, we simply ask what proportion of 
vacancies in a job at level 1 are filled by 
workers employed in level 2 jobs, workers 
employed in level 3 jobs, etc. To fill in 
the elements of such a vector, we need 
information only on a sample of those 
filling vacancies—their  new jobs and 
“The tide of strong economic 
growth at the state and
local level lifts all boats.” 
their old jobs—or, if not coming from an 
existing job in the region, their previous 
labor force status. 
Still following the IO model, we now 
assume that the probability of a given 
link in a job chain (e.g., the probability 
that the vacancy opened at level 3 is 
filled by a worker employed in level 5) 
depends only on the level of the vacancy 
being filled (e.g., level 3), and not on any 
other characteristics of the chain (e.g., 
the chain began with a new job at level 
1). With this key assumption, we need no 
further information concerning job chains. 
In effect, once we are armed with these 
“input vectors,” we can synthesize the 
expected character of chains.    
This approach to job chains greatly 
simplifies empirical requirements. In 
recent work on trickle-down and economic 
development strategies, we use data from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) to construct input vectors for 
an average state for five classes of jobs 
defined by wage level.2 To build the input 
vectors for a given job level, we only need 
information on job changers. We do not 
need observations on entire chains, but 
only a representative sample of unrelated 
chain links. Such data are available from 
workers’ longitudinal job histories like 
the PSID. Without ever creating a sample 
of real job chains, we can now estimate 
all the relevant coefficients of the input 
vectors (Table 1).  Not surprisingly, the 
largest entry in each column falls along 
the diagonal. Depending on the wage 
level, anywhere from 30 to 50 percent of 
hires in jobs come from workers already 
employed at the same level. But these 
hires add little to economic welfare. 
Gains must come from workers moving 
up from one job to a higher one, or from 
nonemployment.    
Armed with these input vectors, it is 
a straightforward matter to generate the 
expected numbers of vacancies opened 
in each wage group as a result of a new 
initial job at any given level. These 
simulations are exactly analogous to the 
calculation of multipliers in IO analysis. 
They give job-chain multipliers. For 
example, a newly created job at level 3 is 
associated with an average chain of 2.7 
vacancies, including 1.87 vacancies at 
level 3 itself, 0.66 vacancies at level 4, 
and 0.2 vacancies at level 5 (Table 2). The 
average chain is then terminated by the 
hiring of an unemployed worker, someone 
out of the labor force, or someone moving 
into the state. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
high-wage jobs like those at level 1 give 
rise to longer chains than low wage jobs 
like those at level 5. But the length of 
a chain is not in itself a measure of the 
chain’s value. To assess the worth of a 
new job, we also need to know the welfare 
gains made along the chain. 
Valuing Average Chains
To the best of our knowledge, analysts 
of housing chains and the like have 
Table 1  Basic Wage Group Transition Matrix (entries are column percentages)
     New wage group
Origin 1 2 3 4 5
Wage group 1 41.1 
Wage group 2 25.0  52.9 
Wage group 3 4.8 22.1 46.6 
Wage group 4 2.2 1.5 18.5 47.3 
Wage group 5 0.0 0.3 2.4 13.3 34.5
Unemployed 2.9 3.8 9.7 15.8 24.7
Out of labor force 4.0 3.8 7.5 13.5 30.5
In-migrant 20.1 15.6 15.4 10.0 10.2
Column sum 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
NOTE:  The data are from 1987 to 1993 and relate to heads and spouses in the PSID. Level 5 has a lower 
bound at the national minimum wage. The upper bound for each wage group is about 50 percent greater 
than the lower bound. See Persky, Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004) for details including justification for 
triangularization. 
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stopped short of calculating formal 
economic welfare benefits associated 
with particular chains. But chains in 
general and job chains in particular lend 
themselves neatly to such estimation. 
Again using the PSID data, we have 
calculated the average welfare gain of 
successful job applicants for each type 
of vacancy. The contributions to these 
averages of job changers are relatively 
easy to estimate from the empirical data. 
We simply count the actual increase in 
wages of similar job movers in the PSID. 
More difficult are the gains attributed to 
those moving from unemployment, out of 
the labor force, or outside the region. Such 
calculations are necessarily speculative. At 
root, any estimate of the welfare gains of 
these groups requires an evaluation of the 
alternative opportunities available to such 
workers. The gain, then, is the difference 
between the wages taken and what was 
given up. Again, see Persky, Felsenstein, 
and Carlson (2004) for details of our 
approach and sensitivity analyses. 
Using these estimates of average 
welfare gains of hires at each vacancy 
level in conjunction with estimates of the 
number of each type of vacancy opened 
by a given chain, we construct estimates 
of the total welfare gain associated with 
each type of new job. In Table 3, these 
welfare gains are expressed as a share of 
the average wage of jobs at each level. 
Thus, we estimate new jobs at the highest 
levels (level 1 and level 2) generate 
welfare benefits equal to little more than 
40 cents per dollar of wages. At the lowest 
levels (level 4 and level 5), these benefits 
amount to more than 60 cents per dollar of 
wages. 
On average a job is worth about 50 
cents per dollar of wages. Thus the normal 
practice of counting up new wages will 
considerably overstate the welfare gains 
generated by economic development 
projects. At the same time, just counting 
the gains to those workers actually taking 
the new jobs would set a much lower 
gain than estimated here. What accounts 
for this substantial discount? It is not job 
changers in the state or locality, because 
job changers leave behind vacancies for 
others to fill. If the entire chain consisted 
of such moves, the cumulative increase 
in wages would approach the wage of the 
new job. Rather, the discount originates 
in the opportunities facing those who 
at start hold no job in the region—the 
unemployed, out of the labor force, and 
in-movers. Of these, our analysis suggests 
that in-movers are the most important. 
Virtually all the difference between the 
two ends of Table 3 are accounted for by 
the greater proportion of in-movers filling 
level 1 vacancies as opposed to level 5 
vacancies. 
When it comes to economic 
development projects, questions of 
efficiency and distribution are very much 
intertwined. A dollar of wages created 
at the low end of the job distribution 
has an efficiency benefit more than 50 
percent greater than a dollar at the high 
end.  This is not based on any notion of 
diminishing marginal utility, although 
such a proposition would only strengthen 
the result. The simple logic here is that 
new high-end workers had substantially 
more attractive alternatives than new low-
end workers. This result, too, seems much 
like common sense.    
Notes
1. The exceptions here are those jobs that are 
well defined in such organizational structures as 
religious denominations.  Hence, White’s path-
breaking efforts to trace job chains among the clergy 
(White 1970).  Also see Webster (1979) for an early 
application of job chains. 
2. The data are from 1987 to 1993 and relate 
to heads and spouses in the PSID.  Level 5 has a 
lower bound at the national minimum wage.  The 
upper bound for each wage group is about 50 
percent greater than the lower bound.  See Persky, 
Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004) for details including 
our justification for triangularizing the matrix in 
Table 1. 
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Table 2  Job-Chain Multiplier Matrix
Table 3  Welfare Gains, by Initial New Job
        Initial new job
Wage groups 1 2 3 4 5
1  1.70 
2  0.90 2.12
3  0.52 0.88 1.87
4  0.28 0.37 0.66 1.90
5  0.08 0.12 0.20 0.39 1.53
All groups 3.48 3.48 2.73 2.28 1.53
           Wage group of initial new job
 1 2 3 4 5
Welfare gains as a share of wages 0.43 0.42 0.56 0.62 0.69
